The parsha that addresses the concept of chukim employs the halachos, laws, of the Parah Adumah, Red Cow, as its standard. Jewish religious thought divides Divine commandments into two categories: “rational” laws, known as mishpatim; and “edicts” or chukim. Making a related distinction, Rabbeinu Saadya Gaon speaks of mitzvos sichliyos, those commandments required by reason, and mitzvos shimiyos, commandments mandated by Revelation. In truth, as the Sefas Emes explains, the overriding approach to mitzvah observance should be in the perspective of chukim, whereby one observes all commandments simply because they constitute an expression of Hashem’s Will. The Piaseczner Rebbe, z.l.,…
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The parsha that addresses the concept of chukim employs the halachos, laws, of the Parah Adumah, Red Cow, as its standard. Jewish religious thought divides Divine commandments into two categories: “rational” laws, known as mishpatim; and “edicts” or chukim. Making a related distinction, Rabbeinu Saadya Gaon speaks of mitzvos sichliyos, those commandments required by reason, and mitzvos shimiyos, commandments mandated by Revelation. In truth, as the Sefas Emes explains, the overriding approach to mitzvah observance should be in the perspective of chukim, whereby one observes all commandments simply because they constitute an expression of Hashem’s Will. The Piaseczner Rebbe, z.l.,…
The parsha that addresses the concept of chukim employs the halachos, laws, of the Parah Adumah, Red Cow, as its standard. Jewish religious thought divides Divine commandments into two categories: “rational” laws, known as mishpatim; and “edicts” or chukim. Making a related distinction, Rabbeinu Saadya Gaon speaks of mitzvos sichliyos, those commandments required by reason, and mitzvos shimiyos, commandments mandated by Revelation. In truth, as the Sefas Emes explains, the overriding approach to mitzvah observance should be in the perspective of chukim, whereby one observes all commandments simply because they constitute an expression of Hashem’s Will. The Piaseczner Rebbe, z.l.,…
The parsha that addresses the concept of chukim employs the halachos, laws, of the Parah Adumah, Red Cow, as its standard. Jewish religious thought divides Divine commandments into two categories: “rational” laws, known as mishpatim; and “edicts” or chukim. Making a related distinction, Rabbeinu Saadya Gaon speaks of mitzvos sichliyos, those commandments required by reason, and mitzvos shimiyos, commandments mandated by Revelation. In truth, as the Sefas Emes explains, the overriding approach to mitzvah observance should be in the perspective of chukim, whereby one observes all commandments simply because they constitute an expression of Hashem’s Will. The Piaseczner Rebbe, z.l.,…
The parsha that addresses the concept of chukim employs the halachos, laws, of the Parah Adumah, Red Cow, as its standard. Jewish religious thought divides Divine commandments into two categories: “rational” laws, known as mishpatim; and “edicts” or chukim. Making a related distinction, Rabbeinu Saadya Gaon speaks of mitzvos sichliyos, those commandments required by reason, and mitzvos shimiyos, commandments mandated by Revelation. In truth, as the Sefas Emes explains, the overriding approach to mitzvah observance should be in the perspective of chukim, whereby one observes all commandments simply because they constitute an expression of Hashem’s Will. The Piaseczner Rebbe, z.l.,…
The parsha that addresses the concept of chukim employs the halachos, laws, of the Parah Adumah, Red Cow, as its standard. Jewish religious thought divides Divine commandments into two categories: “rational” laws, known as mishpatim; and “edicts” or chukim. Making a related distinction, Rabbeinu Saadya Gaon speaks of mitzvos sichliyos, those commandments required by reason, and mitzvos shimiyos, commandments mandated by Revelation. In truth, as the Sefas Emes explains, the overriding approach to mitzvah observance should be in the perspective of chukim, whereby one observes all commandments simply because they constitute an expression of Hashem’s Will. The Piaseczner Rebbe, z.l.,…
The parsha that addresses the concept of chukim employs the halachos, laws, of the Parah Adumah, Red Cow, as its standard. Jewish religious thought divides Divine commandments into two categories: “rational” laws, known as mishpatim; and “edicts” or chukim. Making a related distinction, Rabbeinu Saadya Gaon speaks of mitzvos sichliyos, those commandments required by reason, and mitzvos shimiyos, commandments mandated by Revelation. In truth, as the Sefas Emes explains, the overriding approach to mitzvah observance should be in the perspective of chukim, whereby one observes all commandments simply because they constitute an expression of Hashem’s Will. The Piaseczner Rebbe, z.l.,…
The parsha that addresses the concept of chukim employs the halachos, laws, of the Parah Adumah, Red Cow, as its standard. Jewish religious thought divides Divine commandments into two categories: “rational” laws, known as mishpatim; and “edicts” or chukim. Making a related distinction, Rabbeinu Saadya Gaon speaks of mitzvos sichliyos, those commandments required by reason, and mitzvos shimiyos, commandments mandated by Revelation. In truth, as the Sefas Emes explains, the overriding approach to mitzvah observance should be in the perspective of chukim, whereby one observes all commandments simply because they constitute an expression of Hashem’s Will. The Piaseczner Rebbe, z.l.,…
Calev sought to attract the people’s attention, in order to listen to what they were saying against Moshe: “Is it this alone that the son of Amram has done to us?” Calev gave the inaccurate impression that he would now disparage Moshe (here it was a matter of pikuach nefesh of Klal Yisrael). They were wrong. He only wanted their attention, so that he could reveal the wonderful things that Moshe had done for them. Is one permitted to resort to subterfuge, to give the impression that he is not very observant, only to clarify the matter shortly thereafter? The…
Calev sought to attract the people’s attention, in order to listen to what they were saying against Moshe: “Is it this alone that the son of Amram has done to us?” Calev gave the inaccurate impression that he would now disparage Moshe (here it was a matter of pikuach nefesh of Klal Yisrael). They were wrong. He only wanted their attention, so that he could reveal the wonderful things that Moshe had done for them. Is one permitted to resort to subterfuge, to give the impression that he is not very observant, only to clarify the matter shortly thereafter? The…
